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Abstract 
This paper examines, from a historical perspective, the gradual entrance into the market 
of mutual and not for profit banks (specifically cooperative banks and savings banks), 
their continually increasing competitiveness with traded banks in France, Italy and 
Spain. In all three countries, these institutions played an important role in the retail 
banking sector. Special attention will be devoted to analysing the different models of 
adjustment adopted by the banking systems in the south of Europe in the wake of the 
deregulating process undertaken in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In 
summary, then, this paper is an attempt to identify the historical factors responsible for 
the persistence, or disappearance, of certain idiosyncratic aspects of the banking system 
in each country, together with the various adjustments produced in each case. 
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Richard Sylla has recently restated the traditional view of the importance of 
financial institutions to modern economic development.1 However, when analysing 
these institutions the main focus is usually on commercial banks, relegating in 
consequence a diverse spectrum of financial companies. For that reason, this paper 
proposes a more comprehensive study of the banking systems in Europe. First, I will 
look at three European countries with broadly similar banking traditions, as is the case 
in France, Italy and Spain. Then, within their respective business financial sectors, I will 
examine two types of institution: traded banks and mutual banking intermediaries 
(specifically savings banks and cooperative banks).2 There are two important reasons 
for this approach. Firstly, the scarcity of comparative historical studies which take into 
account both types of intermediary and, secondly, the fact that, historically, in each of 
the three proposed cases the mutual sector has played an important role in the retail 
banking sector.3
What this paper proposes, therefore, is to analyse from a historical perspective the 
gradual entrance into the market of mutual banks, their continually increasing 
competitiveness with traded banks. The analysis will focus on the impact of regulatory, 
institutional and associative changes in the nature of competition between both types of 
institution. Particular attention will be devoted to the different models of adjustment 
adopted by the banking systems in southern Europe in the wake of the deregulation 
process begun in the last quarter of the twentieth century. This paper is an attempt to 
identify the historical factors responsible for the persistence, or disappearance, of 
certain idiosyncratic aspects of the banking systems in each country, together with the 
various adjustments produced in each case. 
Something to bear in mind from the outset is the fact that financial systems in each 
country have shown great versatility in terms of their institutional organisation. On the 
one hand, there is the territorial component which has had an effect on institutional 
customs and categories in the business finance sector. On the other, apparently similar 
institutions may yield different economic results depending on the circumstances in 
which they are operating, as a result of which the role of commercial banks, savings 
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 banks and central banks varies from country to country.4 However, the three 
Mediterranean countries under survey here present some characteristics in common 
which justify a comparative analysis. Most of these features were established on a 
relatively stable basis during the interwar period. Firstly, strong State interventionism in 
the economy, particularly in the credit system. Secondly, the growing importance of 
mutual banks in the retail market. Thirdly, the strong influence of these financial 
intermediaries, in particular the savings banks, on civil society through their role in the 
social policies of the State. Lastly, the pronounced associative strategy adopted by some 
to improve their bargaining position against the regulator. This was the situation after 
the second world war in which a competitive, regulatory environment distinctive to each 
country began to take shape. Nevertheless, that environment was to find itself subjected 
more or less uniformly to the tendency at the end of the 1970s towards deregulation, 
intensified by the financial policies of the EU and by the advance of globalisation in 
general. 
The results of that process as expounded in this paper represent the core of the 
theoretical and empirical debate surrounding the financial system. Each of the three 
countries responded in its own way to the processes of reform; what we observe, in 
other words, is cross-country variation in the presence of convergence pressures. 
However, the analytical tools available to us are not without their drawbacks. For 
example, neo-institutional literature stresses a convergence/divergence dual logic, 
which goes against a dynamic-historical approach involving multiple factors.5 On the 
other hand, the most recent empirical studies (the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
school, Industrial Organisation or approaches based on an explicit use of economic 
theory) highlight the role of institutional variables in financial development.6 This 
approach, however, fails take fully into account certain idiosyncratic factors and their 
persistence or disappearance in the long term. Consequently, here I will adopt a 
historical approach which, as well as the regulatory and institutional factors mentioned, 
will look at business behaviours (whether collusive or competitive), associative models, 
and the relationships between companies and the government and its economic policies. 
In other words, all those factors considered endogenous which characterise the 
processes of internal differentiation and help to create diversity within capitalism. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section two looks at the historical roots of 
mutual intermediaries in countries in southern Europe, specifically savings banks and 
cooperative banks. Section three describes the patterns that governed the competitive, 
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 regulatory environments of the banking systems in France, Italy and Spain during the 
interwar period. Section four details the processes of financial reform undertaken in 
each of the three countries at the end of the seventies, with particular attention to mutual 
banking intermediaries and the consequences of that reform in terms of 
competitiveness. Finally, section five proposes a few material conclusions. 
II 
In the brief period between 1810 and 1825, savings banks made their first successful 
appearance in many European countries. By the middle of the nineteenth century, these 
non-profit banks were numerous throughout the continent, as well as in the United 
States. The second half of the nineteenth century in Europe and the US were witness to 
the creation of new banks organised as consumer cooperatives. These cooperatives were 
highly successful in Germany and to a lesser degree in the rest of Europe. Both 
institutions, non-profit and cooperative banks, played an important role in consumer 
banking. As Henry Hansmann states, non-profit banks arose principally as a means of 
protecting customers from opportunism on the part of the bank, while the cooperative 
banks arose to protect the banks from opportunism on the part of their customers.7
Non-profit banks basically emerged as institutions to amass savings. They were 
organised as mutual savings banks and trust companies, therefore their depositors did 
not participate in the governance of the entity. These institutions, by definition, have no 
owners (no one has a share in both control and residual earnings). Legally speaking they 
were foundations that were constituted as private and charitable trusts. In Europe these 
thrift institutions were founded as charitable organisations to help the poor and the 
working classes.8 Different types of cooperative banks were also created with the aim of 
providing greater access to credit for their members and these acted as genuine 
cooperatives in which their members had formal control of the organisation.9
Savings banks grew, both in terms of the number of entities and the volume of their 
activity, in the whole of Europe throughout the nineteenth century. In England, the 
George Rose Act of 1817 regulated the Trustee Savings Bank system. The board of 
honorary trustees and managers were responsible for the management of local savings 
banks and came into contact with the State by investing their funds with the National 
Debt Commissioners.10 The French model, on the other hand, which was established in 
1818, involved a start-up fund to cover the costs of setting up the entities. In the case of 
possible losses the banks were confident of being able to count on the help of charity 
and public donations.11 The Act of 1837 entrusted the administration of the deposits to 
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 the State-owned Caisse de Dépôts et Consignations (CDC). Somewhat later, the debate 
on the 1895 Act rejected all concessions, such as the idea of investing part of the funds 
in the local economy (the assets of the CDC were invested in long-term government 
securities). Moreover, an advisory body, the Commission Supérieure, was created to 
work with the Ministry of Finance on the regulation of savings banks.12 As a result, for 
a long time the French savings banks were reduced to mere savings collectors. They 
were founded on an outdated business structure and a heavy dependence on the State 
which endured until the second half of the twentieth century.13
{please place Table 1 around here} 
In Italy, prior to political unification, the number of savings banks grew to almost 
one hundred. In general, during the nineteenth century these entities maintained a 
considerably independent status. After 1860 changes were introduced that affected the 
structure of the asset-side business of the Italian savings banks. Mortgage loans and 
securities (government and local authority loans) increased.14 In the case of Germany, 
the regulatory process began towards the end of the 1830s and at the beginning of the 
1840s the governments of the German Länder began introducing measures to promote 
savings banks in general. In Germany, however, the nature of the savings banks was 
markedly diverse. One of the savings banks’ defining characteristics was the fact that, 
from the middle of the nineteenth century, they provided a larger contribution to 
financing than any other group of credit institutions.15 Finally, the Spanish savings bank 
model became established rather later, in 1835, and did not really take off until the 
reforms of 1874-1880.16 The features of the model itself were much closer to those of 
their French counterparts rather than to the British. The former was preferred since it 
was difficult to emulate the British model owing to the problems with the Spanish 
Public Treasury. In fact, the growing public deficit and its inadequate management 
caused people to lose confidence in the Public Debt issued during a good part of the 
19th century.17 These limitations were ultimately to favour the evolution of a type of 
financial activity by the asset side of business specific to Spain which would guarantee 
the sustainability of Spanish savings banks.18
{please place Table 2 around here} 
Of the three countries under survey, in respect of its financial institutions Spain is, 
relatively speaking, the least developed.19 The emergence of banking proper did not 
occur until the promulgation of a number of banking acts in 1856, although it was really 
not until the Restoration of the monarchy in 1874 that any new horizons opened up in 
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 the sector.20 During the last quarter of the century, roughly 50 per cent of the deposit 
market was controlled by the Bank of Spain (the only bank of issue and the only one 
with a large network of branches); see Table 1.21 The remaining banks controlled 
around a third of total desposits, while the savings banks maintained a steady 15 per 
cent share, a proportion well below that of their European counterparts. In France the 
situation was different owing to the enormous importance of the public sector in the 
savings system and the collection capacity of the numerous private and public savings 
banks (by 1881 the State-owned Caisse National d'Epargne had already been set up). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the savings banks' share of the deposit market was 
nearly half of (all) bank deposits (Table 2). It was Italy that presented the most diverse 
banking model, which emphasized the importance of the savings sector. In the last 
quarter of the century, mutual banks accounted for almost a third of all banking 
liabilities (savings banks and cooperative banks, banche popolari). Other public savings 
mechanisms such as deposits and loan funds (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) maintained a 
share of about 25 per cent (Table 3). 
{please place Table 3 around here} 
What we observe, therefore, is that during the nineteenth century, the business paths 
taken by not for profit banks, mutual banks and stock market-traded banks in Europe 
diverged. In the case of not for profit banks, their profile as charitable organisations 
distanced them from the market standards of the rest of the banks. However, by the last 
quarter of the century these institutions penetrated deep into most European countries. 
The savings banks, in particular, had carved for themselves an important space in the 
retail savings deposit market. 
III 
According to Raymond W. Goldsmith, the period between the end of the nineteenth 
century and the First World War saw the formulation in developed countries of a 
modern financial superstructure.22 Jaime Reis, though, has recently demonstrated that, 
in comparative terms, at the turn of the century countries in the south of Europe 
(Portugal, Spain and Italy) were institutionally and financially less developed than the 
countries of Scandinavia.23 However, despite the relatively inferior growth in GDP per 
capita in the Mediterranean region, in financial terms the gap tended to close as the 
century progressed. The role of the State as financial agent was confirmed in the three 
countries during the interwar period. From 1880 the volume of savings controlled by the 
State through the market grew to between two and three times that reached by the 
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 business finance system (in the years leading up to the war, in per capita terms, the 
public debt in Italy was slightly greater than the liabilities of all the business finance 
institutions; in Spain it was 2.5 times greater).24 The first world war intensified that 
trend. 
In France, during the first half of the 20th century, savings banks experienced no 
substantial change. They gradually lost importance in the banking system as a whole as 
a consequence of their marked institutional inflexibility (Table 2). This position 
distanced them from the regulatory changes and from the more flexible use of resources 
being experienced by other European savings banks.25  On the other hand, in both Italy 
and Spain, significant regulatory changes took place during this period. Both countries 
were home at the time to a markedly authoritarian political regime with corporativist 
economic policies (Mussolini's Fascism, 1922-1943, and the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930). In 1921 and 1926, a new Banking Act was 
proclaimed in each (in Spain and Italy, respectively). The new law changed the 
countries' nineteenth-century banking statute, though with significant differences 
between them. The Spanish law left the banking sector a considerable margin of self-
regulation, while the Italian law subjected the credit system as a whole to severe 
regulation. 
The instrument of self-regulation in Spain was the banking council (Consejo 
Superior Bancario, CSB), made up of representatives of the bank under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Finance.26 The savings banks remained aloof from banking regulation 
as a result of the solid resistance provoked by the government's proposal to subject them 
to the authority of the CSB. Indeed, the three additional savings banks acts, passed in 
1926, 1929 and 1933, are indicative of the strong intersectoral pressure that was brought 
to bear. It was ultimately the 1933 statute that was to define how the sector was 
regulated until the financial transition at the end of the 1970s. The savings banks 
retained their socio-economic profile, the financial component of which was decidedly 
less pronounced than in their Italian counterparts. An additional development was the 
establishment of a special registry to obtain charter as a savings bank. Social objectives 
were granted priority over the objective of solvency, with the institution of a system of 
loan portfolio management and compulsory investment in government debt. For the first 
time, specific funding was allocated for social works (guaranteed minimum expenditure 
of 50 per cent of surplus). Ultimately, what the new legislation reflected was the 
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 pressure by the State on the savings banks to participate in the government's social 
policy. 
The new legislation in Italy adopted a different approach. In 1926 the Bank of Italy 
was granted monopoly of issue (the Bank of France had held this right since 1848 and 
the Bank of Spain since 1874) and a definite regulatory model that included the savings 
banks was put in place. The legislation established entry barriers in both sectors, 
solvency coefficients and controls on the opening of new branches. Two subsequent 
decrees (1927 and 1928) prompted the consolidation of the sector through a series of 
mergers led by the main regional and provincial savings banks. In 1930 the number of 
savings banks had fallen by half (fewer than one hundred remained).27 In sum, State 
control of the savings banks increased, limiting their autonomy in areas such as the 
reform of their statutes or the naming of high-level officials. In fact, under the aegis of 
regulatory change, the savings banks were gradually assimilated into the institutions of 
public law.28
The associative dimension of French savings banks was limited, owing to their 
dependence on State finances; in fact, no sectoral association was formed until the end 
of the 1960s.29 In the matter of associationism the savings banks in Italy took their first 
steps in 1911 with the Associazione fra le Casse di Risparmio Italiane (ACRI). A 
decade later, in 1921, saw the creation of the savings bank credit institution (ICCRI), a 
wholesaler of retail finance with clearing functions (later on a similar body was set up to 
supply the banche popolari); a similar kind of institution was being developed at the 
same time in other European countries such as Finland, Spain and Norway.30 However, 
this associative tendency came up against the progressive officialisation of the Italian 
savings banks.31 In Spain, by contrast, the organisational autonomy of the savings banks 
was reinforced by the appearance in 1924 of the first regional associations, culminating 
in 1928 with the creation of the national savings bank association (Confederación 
Española de Cajas de Ahorro, CECA).32 The new association reflected two influences, 
one external, the other internal: the First International Congress of Savings in Milan in 
1924, which advocated savings bank associationism; and government attempts to place 
the savings banks under the authority of the CSB. The process was completed by the 
creation of the savings bank credit institution (Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas de 
Ahorro, ICCA). The ICCA became the savings banks’ bank and the money lending 
agency for the government and other official bodies.33 The process begun in 1928 was 
just the first stage in a long series of collaborative practices, which in the long term 
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 would allow Spanish savings banks to develop collaborative and outsourcing strategies 
to compete with the other banks in the retail market.34
Corporate strategies emerged according to a number of different variables. In 
France, the savings banks maintained a very passive attitude to market trends and the 
public savings bank sector became more robust (Table 2). Their counterparts in Italy 
and Spain, on the other hand, presented a more aggressive front against the commercial 
banks. In contrast to the French savings banks, the Italian and Spanish mutual 
intermediaries applied substantial innovations on the asset side. After the First World 
War, the entry of new agents to the banking market in Italy resulted in greater diversity. 
The mutual sector saw the emergence of new cooperative banks, resolutely local in 
character (rural and artisanal banks). The Banche Popolari, for their part, increased their 
territorial and business scope (Table 3). In the public banking sphere, new public law 
and national interest banks reflected the growing importance of public sector banking. 
Lastly, the new banks instigated by the onset of industrialisation, such as the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana and the Credito Italiano, indicated the growing importance of 
universal banking. This last tendency led, in terms of quota, to significant fluctuation of 
savings and cooperative banks, although in absolute terms their volume of business 
continued to increase. Finally, before the Second World War, the Banking Act of 1936 
introduced additional segmentation to the banking system, restricting autonomy of the 
mutual banks and creating new oversight organisms. 
{please place Table 4 around here} 
In Spain the market model was set by banks with a business profile comparable to 
that of universal banking.35 At the start of the century, the regional banks in Madrid and 
the Basque Country began to expand across the country, as a result of which the Bank 
of Spain started to lose ground in the deposit market (Table 1). The banks reaped the 
benefits for neutral countries to be had from the war, though afterwards found 
themselves hit by the banking crises in 1924-25 and the international crisis in the 1930s. 
At the same time, the cooperatives began to gain in strength. A number of cooperative 
banks were operating in the area of rural financing by the end of the 1890s but this 
activity was not regulated until 1906. According to the Statistical Census carried out by 
the Ministry of Agriculture in 1933, deposits in cooperative banks amounted to 1.3 per 
cent of the total deposits in Spain.36 In fact, the cooperative banks were to play only a 
minor role in the Spanish banking market until the last quarter of the century (Table 4). 
The savings banks, meanwhile, unlike the banks, were hit hard by the crisis at the end of 
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 the century and by the war afterwards. However they did manage to recover their share 
of the market, particularly since they did not find themselves as badly affected by the 
banking crises in the second half of the twenties (in the years prior to the civil war they 
controlled over a quarter of the deposit market; Table 1). In 1916 a new institution was 
integrated to the savings system; the Post Office Savings Banks (State-owned), which in 
1935, due to their presence in the entire country, reached a 3.5% share of deposits. 
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that during the interwar period several common 
patterns emerged in the banking systems of the three countries, in addition to a number 
of others specific to each. Among the shared developments we find the presence of the 
State as credit claimant and its growing control over the credit system. Another 
common trend was the diversity of banking institutions, particularly in Italy. Finally, the 
growth of the savings banks in all three countries outstripped all the other mutual 
institutions. We also observe certain idiosyncratic aspects specific to each. In France, 
for example, the savings banks remained reluctant to diversify their business. In Italy 
the mutual sector evolved a business model similar to banking practice, while 
associative ties were diminished by excessive public sector control. Finally, in Spain the 
associative role of the CECA set in motion a series of far-reaching collaborative 
initiatives. All these factors affected competition between banks and savings banks, and 
the banking market as a whole. In each country numerous barriers existed, the majority 
relating to regulatory pressures and the collusive practices of the big banks. 
Unquestionably, however, the mutual intermediaries began to participate in the market 
structures. 
IV 
In general terms, the end of the Second World War marked an increase in the 
segmentation of the banking market. In the mutual sector, particularly for savings 
banks, certain tendencies noted in the decade before the war were now consolidated. In 
Italy post-war legislation brought the savings banks into the broad category of public 
credit institutions. In France state regulation of the savings banks continued by 
associating them with the CGD and the old Commission Supérieur. The most extreme 
case was undoubtedly that of Spain. After the civil war, the Franco regime established a 
series of public finance objectives that both banks and savings banks were expected to 
achieve. In the case of the banks, however, once those objectives had been reached, the 
government relaxed their control.37 The savings banks were a different story; with them, 
the government maintained an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, their 
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 administrative capacity was severely curtailed, particularly with regard to investment. 
On the other, the government encouraged their expansion and protected their operations 
against the banks (first wave of mergers 1940-63).38 State intervention continued to rise, 
to the point that, after the regulations introduced by the 1962 Banking Act, 80 per cent 
of the savings banks’ external funds were controlled by the State.39
This dichotomy explains why Spanish savings banks were the only ones to 
consolidate their associative organs and operations, continuing the tradition established 
in the interwar period. By contrast, the autonomy of their French and Italian 
counterparts was diminished. In Italy the ACRI preserved its role as a lobby and middle 
ground between savings banks, executives of the Bank of Italy and the government. 
However, after the war its participation in interbank operations and in the area of 
sectoral self-regulation was gradually subsumed under the Italian Banking Association 
(ABI).40
The Spanish experience was very different. In the course of its long history, the 
CECA had to overcome a variety of problems but its representative role in the sector 
and its connexions with the ICCA were greater than those of the ACRI in Italy. 
Following the equalisation of savings banks and commercial banks under the 1971 
Credit Law, the CECA began a series of collaborative and outsourcing measures which 
were to have a profound effect on the absorption of information and telecommunication 
technologies (ICT) by the savings banks. In 1970 the Commission of Organisation, 
Automation and Services (COAS, a commission authorized by the board of directors of 
CECA for technological operating areas and new services) was set up, which in the 
decades following would contribute to the modernisation of the sector.41 The savings 
banks in Italy tried the same strategy, in fact, though later, in 1977, through the ICCRI’s 
creation of the STACRI (automatic teletransmission system for Italian savings banks).42 
In short, it was Spanish savings banks which made the greatest associative and 
organisational advances in the sector, and this placed them in a better position than their 
southern counterparts when confronted by new changes in the eighties and nineties.43
In the final decades of the twentieth century, problems deriving from technological 
advances, financial disintermediation, changes in customer behaviour, European 
regulation, etc. had a serious impact on all Western economies. However, at a national 
level, Italy, Spain and France faced an additional challenge: how to dismantle a State 
constructed bound up with the credit system. The coincidence of financial and structural 
reform intensified the experience of change in these three countries. 
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 The point of departure was not the same in each case. In Italy at the start of the 
eighties the first steps were taken to resolve public banking problems in the 
Mezzogiorno. Later on the 1990 Ley Amato drew the savings banks into the process and, 
consolidated the conversion of public and savings banks into joint-stock companies.44 In 
Spain financial transformations were produced as a result of the processes of economic 
modernisation undertaken by the first governments of the political transition following 
the end of the dictatorship in the mid-seventies. Faced with the need to expand and 
modernise the financial system, the governments opted to modernise the savings banks 
and place them on an equal footing with the commercial banks.45 In France, meanwhile, 
reform originated within the government (newly-appointed socialist government), faced 
with the need to substitute outdated systems of overprotection and tax exemption. 
Legislation passed after 1979 and the new governments at the beginning of the 1980s 
brought about a radical centralisation of the mutual sector (in particular the laws passed 
in 1983 and 1999).46
In general terms, the reform of the savings banks was based on altering the 
ownership structure. In France and Italy the issue was addressed head-on, though using 
different approaches. In France, the cooperative society model was adopted. In Italy, to 
convert the savings bank into a joint-stock company, it was subdivided into savings 
bank-foundation and joint stock company-savings bank. The former was responsible for 
social works, and acted as stock-holder of the latter (a process initiated under the 1990 
Ley Amato and continued under the 1993 Testo Unico, the 1994 Directiva Dini and the 
1999 Decreto Ciampi).47 In Spain, the savings banks' profile as non-profit foundations 
did not change. Each of the approaches adopted, the Franco-Italian and the Spanish, 
though markedly different in its own way, has led to the capitalisation of the savings 
banks and the consolidation of the banking sector. However, the safeguard of sectoral 
status is really only the case in Spain. 
{please place Table 5 around here} 
The process of consolidation followed a similar pattern in Italy, France and Spain, 
according to a series of mergers and acquisitions. In Spain these operations were 
necessarily intrasectoral, while in Italy regulatory policy created a tendency towards the 
consolidation of credit organisms of various kinds. The process of reform encouraged 
convergence in the form of joint-stock companies. The result was the formation of 
multifunctional groups with universal banking characteristics (Table 5).48 The French 
model presented an extreme case of consolidation, since officially the savings banks had 
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 been converted into a single cooperative business group, Groupe Caisse d’Epargne 
(similar to what occurred in Spain in 1990 between the cooperative banks and the 
Banco Cooperativo Español financier group).49 Consolidation in the French case 
occurred later on, in 1999. Prior to this, the public and private banking sector underwent 
similar processes, in this instance involving vertical integration (BNP-Paribas and 
Société Général and lately the takeover of Crédit Lyonnais by Crédit Agricole in 2003). 
{please place Table 6 around here} 
The Spanish model presents a number of asymmetries. Banks were merged with or 
taken over by other banks; savings banks did the same with other savings banks and 
with cooperative banks since, according to both the 1985 Savings Bank Law (LORCA) 
and the 2002 Financing Law, no bank is permitted to own a stake in a savings bank. A 
savings bank, however, may take over a banking network, a circumstance which must 
surely constitute one of the most striking asymmetries in the Spanish system. The 
Spanish case is the most problematic in terms of market openness, owing precisely to 
the asymmetry deriving from the protection of the savings banks against the banks. The 
paradox deepens if we consider the high level of participation by savings banks in non-
financial companies and the presence of top savings bank executives on their boards of 
directors That said, banks and savings banks in Spain do compete in an open market in 
terms of products and services, where savings banks also compete among themselves, a 
situation that Bernardo Batiz-Lazo placed within the processes of competitive 
collaboration.50
{please place Table 7 around here} 
So have these changes caused any modification of the corporate strategy of mutual 
intermediaries? Savings banks and cooperative banks in all three countries 
unquestionably experienced some degree of specialisation, a process which we can look 
at in terms of household and retail markets. The only exception to this would be the 
Italian savings banks which had a significant involvement in the business sector even 
before the reform. Table 6 also shows that the percentage of loans the Italian savings 
banks were granting to government offices shrank after the reforms, while the 
percentage granted to the household sector grew. Greater diversification was, generally 
speaking, in keeping with the diversification of the Italian banking market as a whole 
and the emergence of universal banking. The French savings banks, once they put aside 
their institutional peculiarities, were able to improve their competitive advantage in 
certain products.51 The Groupe Caisse d'Épargne is one of the most important money 
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 lending institutions for local governments and other local authorities.52 Table 7 shows 
how the cooperative banks, collectively, have increased their share of the credit market 
while that of the banks has maintained a steady level. On the deposits side, the old 
savings banks have managed to modernise their products without losing ground in what 
would be considered their more traditional markets. Lastly, in Spain the convergence 
between banks and savings banks has been total. The two compete in terms of products 
in all sectors. The results are obvious. Table 4 shows some of the credit and deposit 
markets in which the two compete with a very similar market share. In the mid-
seventies the savings banks' share in the credit market was half that of the deposit 
market which they contested with banks. By the end of the century the two were 
practically equal. Today there is little fundamental difference between the corporative 
strategies of either banks or savings banks. The cooperative banks, operating in large 
part as a group, have meanwhile succeeded in implanting themselves as a new banking 
market middleman, though without altering the institutional polarity characteristic of the 
Spanish system. 
Reform seems to have succeeded, then, not only in redefining the boundaries 
between institutions, but in encouraging the competitiveness of banking markets in the 
south of Europe. The instruments contributing to this success have been specialization 
and product diversification. And lastly: what can we conclude about southern European 
savings banks in relation to their northern and central European counterparts? Spanish 
savings banks come out on top, without question, alongside their Norwegian equivalent, 
both holding credit and deposit shares in the region of 40 per cent of the banking 
system. In other European countries the savings banks' share is well below that level 
(except for Germany, holding in the region of 30 per cent). This trend was established in 
the early nineties; prior to that, savings banks in Sweden, Norway and Germany 
occupied a stronger market share position.53
{please place Table 8 around here} 
To end this section, Table 8 collates the business results at the end of the last century 
for all the institutions surveyed in this paper. In the context of the fall of financial 
margins characterizing the end of the century, a comparison of results shows Spanish 
savings banks and the new societies in Italy faring better than the French cooperative 
group. Although generally speaking, the mutual banks achieved better results than the 
commercial banks in these three countries during century’s last decade. The same 
conclusion applies for both net interest income and net ordinary income data. Savings 
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 banks in Spain and Italy also showed relatively greater stability in terms of net 
operating income results which at the end of the century outstripped those of their 
counterparts in northern and central Europe and compared favourably with those of the 
overall financial sector average in each country, particularly in the Spanish case. In 
terms of profitability, the successors of the Italian savings bank stand out, though 
savings bank profits in Spain improved substantially with respect to banks in the last 
decade of the century. Last of all, operational efficiency (in other words the ratio 
between operating expenses and net ordinary revenues) is notable among Spanish 
savings banks, outperforming the banks in the country and the rest of the intermediary 
bodies in southern Europe (only Norwegian savings banks show greater efficiency 
results: see OCDE, Bank Profitability). However, in Italian savings banks with a high 
volume of assets, efficiency levels have also improved, allowing for the creation of 
confederated banking groups on the basis of aquisitions.54
V 
Stock market-traded banks and mutual banking intermediaries developed along very 
different lines in the nineteenth century. In the former, the most important factor was 
the market; in the latter, their condition as charitable organisations. In the century that 
followed, and particularly during the interwar period, savings and cooperative bank 
involvement in the market intensified. However, in Italy, Spain and France, despite this 
amplified participation on the part of the new intermediary banks, the banking market 
remained deeply segmented and strongly influenced by the public sector. These features 
continued to characterise the situation until the introduction of reforms at the end of the 
century. 
The historical evidence would seem to indicate that when confronted with the trend 
towards convergence induced by external forces (globalisation and Europeanisation), 
the institutions in each country opted to adapt (ie. converge) rather than resist those 
external pressures (diverge). Adaptation is therefore understood as a change conditioned 
by endogenous factors. This would account for why each country adopted a different 
institutional approach, obtaining similar results in certain areas (concentration of the 
industry, liberalisation and improvement of competition, etc.) and different results in 
others (different business strategies, institutional variety, etc.).55
From a regulatory point of view, the banking system has tended to oscillate between 
two classic organisational attitudes: regulation versus competition policy.56 In some 
instances priority was given to ensuring a stable, efficient sector over the protection of 
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 competition; in others, proper competition policies were deemed necessary to guarantee 
the efficiency of the industry. In the three cases surveyed here, historically it has been 
the regulatory attitude which has dominated within the financial system overall. Only 
since the reforms initiated at the end of the 1970s has a more flexible system of 
regulation emerged to encourage competition in the sector. Having examined the three 
cases, it is possible to conclude that in all instances mutual intermediaries have 
contributed to the consolidation of the banking industry, either in the more radical form 
of mergers and acquisitions or more gently (partnerships and alliances).57 The processes 
of coordination/cooperation in France and Italy were translated from the sector to the 
group while in Spain coordination remained sectoral, though within new parameters. 
Competitive cooperation was introduced in the Spanish savings bank sector, while in 
the commercial banks competition developed within the group. Desegmentation did not 
eliminate differences and variety within the financial system. It did, however, signify a 
reduced role for the State in its organisation. One final note in this connexion is to point 
out that the French banking system is the least varied of the three; the variety of the 
Spanish system has survived, while that of the Italian is less than it was. In short, the 
diversity persists even though market conditions are institutionally much more open.  In 
these three countries, adaptation to global conditions has been under pressure from 
endogenous factors. 
The literature offers a number of different approaches to the subject, allowing a 
more comprehensive comparative analysis of the Spanish and Italian cases. The 
importance of savings banks in the restructuring of the banking systems in both 
countries has already been acknowledged. In Italy, under the new institutional model, 
savings banks have secured their importance relative to other competitors in their 
different lines of business and their territorial presence, while at the same time 
improving profitability and adapting their costs structure.58 In Spain deregulation, while 
increasing competition and eroding the banks' market power, simultaneously established 
incentives to adopt greater credit risk levels.59 In other words, although the efficiency of 
the system improved, collusive market-power practices persisted, resulting in very high 
costs in some cases (in the loans market for example). The savings banks, however, 
have continued inexorably to gain market share at the expense of the banks, in both the 
deposit and credit markets.60 In both cases, having experienced very different 
institutional transformation processes, the mutual and not for profit intermediaries have 
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 played a central role in the recent banking system transformations in their respective 
countries. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Share of Bank Deposits in Spain (1875-1950) 
  
Bank of 
Spain Banks 
Post Office 
Savings 
Bank 
Savings 
Banks 
1875 41.6 47.2 - 11.2 
1880 41.5 46.5 - 12.0 
1885 49.3 35.4 - 15.4 
1890 58.0 27.9 - 14.1 
1895 51.1 32.1 - 16.8 
1900 56.7 32.1 - 11.2 
1905 45.0 38.5 - 16.5 
1910 32.2 48.4 - 19.4 
1915 35.1 43.9 - 21.0 
1920 21.8 62.6 1.6 14.0 
1925 18.8 59.5 2.7 19.1 
1930 8.0 69.7 2.7 19.6 
1935 6.5 66.9 3.4 23.2 
1941 NA NA 1.5 14.8 
1945 7.0 74.4 1.6 17.0 
1950 3.6 75.7 1.4 19.3 
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de España and Boletín Mensual de 
Estadística. Caja de ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid, Annual Reports and Statistics, 1878-1935. 
Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades Anónimas de España (Madrid, 1916-1950). P. Martín Aceña, La 
cantidad de dinero en España 1900-1935, (Madrid, 1985), p. 104 and Una estimación de los principales 
agregados monetarios en España: 1940-1962, Bank of Spain, Documento de Trabajo 8807 (1988), p. 
109. G. Tortella (dir.), La banca española en la Restauración, (Madrid, 1974), Vol.1, p.490. 
 
 
Table 2 
Share of Bank Deposits in France (1900-1950) 
  Banks 
Private 
Savings 
Banks 
National 
Savings 
Banks 
Aggregate 
Savings 
Banks 
Aggregate 
Banking 
Institutions
1900 51.3 37.2 11.5 48.7 100 
1905 58.3 30.3 11.5 41.7 100 
1910 63.2 25.6 11.1 36.8 100 
1913 66.2 23.3 10.6 33.8 100 
1920 75.6 17.4 7.0 24.4 100 
1925 73.9 18.7 7.5 26.1 100 
1930 67.4 19.9 12.7 32.6 100 
1935 46.7 31.4 21.9 53.3 100 
1940 62.7 22.0 15.2 37.3 100 
1945 67.7 10.8 21.6 32.3 100 
1950 71.2 14.8 14.0 28.8 100 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, Europe (1750-2000) (New York, 2003), pp. 
794, 796, 800, 805. 
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Table 3 
Share of Bank Liabilities in Italy (1875-1950) 
Commercial Banks Mutuals Banks 
  
Banks of 
Issue Banks Public Banks 
Cassa 
Depositi e 
Prestiti 
Savings 
Banks* 
Banche 
Popolari 
Cooperative 
Rural and 
Artisans' 
Banks 
1875 42.0 29.8 -  21.7 6.5 - 
1880 29.4 16.6 - 31.5 17.1 5.4 - 
1885 31.2 23.7 - 15.4 21.1 8.6 - 
1890 31.0 19.8 - 19.7 20.5 9.0 - 
1895 31.1 13.8 - 24.0 23.2 8.0 - 
1900 26.2 14.9 - 25.8 24.6 8.5 - 
1905 23.1 20.3 - 24.3 22.8 9.1 0.4 
1910 22.2 18.3 - 24.6 22.7 11.5 0.7 
1915 30.4 18.3 - 22.5 19.9 8.4 0.5 
1920 33.4 31.3 - 15.1 12.2 7.6 0.5 
1925 25.0 35.7 - 14.0 15.6 8.7 1.0 
1930 16.6 35.9 4.5 16.6 18.5 6.8 1.1 
1935 15.5 26.2 6.8 25.5 20.7 4.7 0.7 
1940 20.2 8.5 26.5 26.4 13.3 5.0 - 
1945 43.6 9.6 22.7 9.8 8.9 5.1 0.3 
1950 27.7 11.0 28.5 17.1 10.1 5.3 0.3 
Source: P. Ciocca and A. M. Biscaini, ‘Italian Financial Structures: Long-Term Quantitative Aspects 
(1870-1970)’, in G. Federico, The Economic Development of Italy since 1870 (Aldershot, 1994), pp. 538-
541. 
* Including Pledge Banks. 
 
 
Table 4 
Establishment and Share of Deposits and Credits in Spanish Credit entities (1962-2000) 
Number of banks  Share of deposits  Share of credits 
  Banks 
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks  Banks
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks  Banks 
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks 
1962 111 83 NA  72.4 27.6 NA  89.5 10.5 NA 
1965 129 86 NA  70.5 29.5 NA  85.9 14.1 NA 
1970 114 87 NA  64.4 34.1 1.5  78.6 19.7 1.7 
1975 114 88 NA  65.0 32.3 2.7  79.0 18.9 2.0 
1980 125 80 NA  63.6 32.8 3.5  75.8 21.2 2.9 
1985 139 79 146  56.4 38.9 4.7  70.0 26.5 3.5 
1990 154 66 107  50.7 44.5 4.8  62.7 34.3 3.0 
1995 170 51 97  44.6 49.5 5.9  57.7 38.3 4.1 
2000 141 48 92  39.9 52.7 7.3  51.8 43.3 4.9 
Source: Bank of Spain, Boletín Estadístico del Banco de España. Consejo Superior Bancario, Boletín del 
CSB and Asociación Española de la Banca, Anuario Estadístico de la Banca en España. Confederación 
Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Anuario Estadístico. 
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Table 5 
Number of Credits entities in Italy (1960-2000) 
 
Banks* Savings Banks 
Banche 
Popolari 
Cooperative
Rural and 
Artisans' 
Banks 
Total 
1960 218 88 210 739 1 255
1965 210 97 210 767 1 284
1980 351 91 158 650 1 250
1985 273 89 140 701 1 203
1990 249 84 108 715 1 156
1995 256 77 98 622 976
2000 234 64 44 499 841
Source: Banca d'Italia, Collana Storica and Bollettino Statistico. 
* Including foreign banks offices 
 
 
Table 6 
Composition of assets and liabilities in Italian banks by activity sector 
1980  1986  1996 
  
All 
banks 
Savings 
Banks  
All 
banks 
Savings 
Banks  
All 
banks 
Savings 
Banks 
Loans 
Households 2.8 17.8  3.6 18.4  36.0 38.7 
Government 9.5 11.6  8.0 6.7  5.0 6.6 
Non-financial firms 85.2 68.4  81.6 69.6  48.3 45.3 
Other 2.5 2.3  6.8 5.2  10.7 9.3 
Liabilities               
Households 71.6 72.4  75.1 80.6  62.5 63.9 
Government 7.7 10.3  3.8 4.2  2.9 3.0 
Non-financial firms 19.4 15.2  19.3 13.7  9.2 7.3 
Other 1.3 2.1  1.8 1.5  25.5 25.8 
Source: C. Schena, ‘I riflessi della despecializzazione normativa sulla struttura del bilancio delle casse di 
risparmio. Un analisi su dati aggregati’, in Locatelli (ed.), Le Casse di risparmio tra localismo e 
despecializzazione (Milan, 1998), pp.135-156. 
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Table 7 
Establishment and Share of Deposits and Credits in France Banks (1980-2000) 
Number of banks  Share of deposits  Share of credits 
  Banks
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks Others Total  Banks
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks Others  Banks
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks Others
1980 340 471 214 950 1 975  - - - - - - - - - 
1984 349 468 195 989 2 001  - - - - - - - - - 
1986 402 378 188 1186 2 154  49.9 17.4 27.9 4.8  50.7 3.9 20.8 24.6 
1988 395 280 182 1193 2 050  48.0 21.8 28.0 2.2  47.2 4.0 19.8 29.0 
1990 408 186 176 1211 1 981  48.5 19.1 30.7 1.7  48.5 4.1 21.2 26.3 
1995 413 35 136 869 1 453  44.7 18.5 35.2 1.6  46.9 4.9 21.2 27.1 
2000 360 - 157 591 1 108  49.1 - 49.0 1.9  54.2 - 30.2 15.6 
Source: OECD, Banks profitability and O. Butzbach, Varieties within capitalism?The modernisation of French and Italian savings banks, 1980-2000 (Brussels 2007), p. 230. 
 
Table 8 
Financial Rates in Credit Institutions, 1988 and 1999 (in percentage) 
France  Italy  Spain 
  Banks 
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks Others
All Banking 
System 
Savings 
Banks Banks 
Savings 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks 
1988 2.0 1.2 2.6 1.7 3.4 - 4.1 4.4 4.9 Net interest income of balance sheet total 
(average total) 1999 0.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.5 1.8 2.7 3.4 
1988 2.5 1.6 2.8 2.3 4.4 - 5.2 5.2 5.2 Net interest  and non-interest income of 
balance sheet total (average total)  1999 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.6 3.6 3.9 2.9 3.8 4.1 
1988 0.7 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.6 - 2.1 1.4 2.0 Net income before provisions of balance 
sheet total (average total) 1999 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.6 
1988 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.0 - 1.4 0.8 1.5 Income before tax of balance sheet total 
(average  total) 1999 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.4 
1988 15.5 10.7 14.9 16.2 17.1 - 13.5 9.5 13.1 Income before tax of capital and reserves 
1999 10.1 5.3 11.1 12.9 13.9 16.0 10.5 12.8 11.1 
1988 1.8 1.3 2.2 1.2 2.8 - 3.1 3.9 3.1 Operating expenses of balance sheet total 
(average total) 1999 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.3 2.5 
1988 73.0 79.2 76.0 53.2 63.0 - 59.0 74.2 61.2 Operating expenses of net intererest and 
non-interest income 1999 70.6 77.7 65.7 55.5  60.7 63.0  64.4 61.8 60.8 
Source: OECD, Income Statement and Balance Sheet, Banks Profitability. Bank of Italy, Collana Storica and Bolletino Statistico. Bank of Spain, Boletín Estadístico. 
 
 
